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Abstract 
 
The Rationality of Perception (RP) depicts a kind of ‘double counting’ in which 
prior beliefs help to cause percepts that are then taken as evidence for those 
very beliefs. The correct response, RP argues, is to epistemically downgrade 
the percepts themselves, thus de-fanging their apparent role as rational 
support. I question RP’s depiction of double-counting on the grounds that it 
fails to distinguish between cases involving the rational and the irrational use 
of prior information, and may lead to a kind of runaway epistemic 
downgrading. More positively, I suggest that to decide whether we confront 
a rational or irrational use of prior information, it helps to extend the 
temporal window and to bring world-altering action into the equation.  
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
 
The Rationality of Perception (henceforth, RP) is a stunning, elegant, 
astoundingly closely argued treatment. It raises new (and timely) issues, and 
makes a striking proposal. In this short treatment, I aim to highlight and 
engage just one aspect of this densely woven plot. That aspect is neatly 
summed up in the opening pages of RP with the question: 
 
“…if your prior beliefs could influence your experiences, how could 
those very experiences go on to strengthen your beliefs?” 
RP xiv (my emphasis) 
 
To illustrate the puzzle, RP offers multiple possible examples of a kind of 
malicious influence in which prior beliefs seem to cause percepts that are 
wrongly taken as evidence for those very beliefs. One such case is loosely 
based on Dutch microscopist Antonie van Leeuwenhoek, who in 1677 first 
saw spermatozoa under the microscope. Already prone to preformationism 
(the idea that adult human bodies are fully but minutely preformed in 
human sperm), van Leewenhoek ‘found’ as visible in semen: 
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 "all manner of great and small vessels, so various and so numerous 
that I do not doubt that they be nerves, arteries and veins...And when 
I saw them, I felt convinced that, in no full grown body, are there any 
vessels which may not be found likewise in semen.”  From a letter 
quoted in Friedman 2002 p.76-77 
 
A cleaner, but purely fictional, example is that of Jack and Jill (RP p.6, and 
throughout…): 
 
 
“Before seeing Jack, Jill fears that Jack is angry at her. When she sees 
him, her fear causes her to perceive Jack as angry, and this perception 
strengthens her fear.” 
 
 
Jill now feels that she has more reason for her fear. But is it rational for her to 
do so? Is it rational for her to believe her eyes and thus strengthen her prior 
(percept-inducing) belief that he is angry?  On the one hand, it looks like Jill 
and the preformationist are just ‘doing [their] best with the evidence’ (RP 
p.6). But it also looks suspiciously like double-counting, as the ‘Jack-is-
angry’ fear and the prior beliefs of the preformationists played some role in 
causing the experiences (of seeing visual signs of anger, of seeing tiny nerves 
and veins) that now seem to further justify those very beliefs (that Jack is 
angry, that sperm house tiny humans).  
 
This is what Siegel calls the ‘problem of hijacked experience’ and results in 
the actual (raw) perceptual inputs not being given their “proper weight” (RP 
p.11). In such cases, the correct response, it is argued, is to epistemically 
downgrade the percepts themselves, thus de-fanging their apparent role as 
rational support. This means that we must now hold our own perceptual 
experiences to account. Instead of simply providing evidence that may freely 
be used to strengthen a belief, our perceptual experiences turn out to be as 
apt for epistemological assessment and critique as the judgments we base on 
them. Like judgments, they may be well- or ill-founded. Hence the titular 
conclusion, that perception itself is rationally assessable. Our perceptual 
experiences, if this is right, are not epistemically neutral after all. Instead, 
percept formation can itself be rational or irrational, as can the resulting 
experiences (see e.g. the thesis statement on RP p15). If RP is correct, then 
the epistemic status of a perceptual experience can be weakened by how it is 
formed or grounded (just like that of beliefs). 
  
For the purposes of this essay, I’m going to simply assume that such effects 
(of belief, fear, etc. on bedrock perceptual experience) occur, and ask how 
we might think about them when they do. I think we have compelling 
	 3	
cognitive scientific  reasons (Clark 2013; 2016) to think such effects are real 
– but these are not my focus. Instead, assuming they are real, I’ll argue that 
the appearance of circularity and double-counting is – very often but not 
always- not to be feared, and ought not automatically result in epistemic 
downgrade. 
 
In what follows I question RP’s depiction of double-counting, mostly on the 
grounds that it fails to distinguish between cases involving the rational and 
the irrational use of prior information. More positively, I suggest that to 
decide whether we confront a rational or irrational use of prior information, 
it helps both to extend the temporal window and to bring world-altering 
action into the equation.  In other words, we shouldn’t just ask these 
questions about ‘snapshot’ perceptual moments but instead look at how the 
resulting percepts lead to exploratory actions that may (or may not) seem to 
confirm the percepts. It is this ‘testing in action’ that enables them quite 
properly, though never infallibly, to increase our confidence in the prior 
belief.  If I’m right, then the initial appearance of circularity/double-
counting is often a red herring, and by stressing it we may be exposing 
ourselves to a kind of runaway epistemic downgrading. In what follows, I 
try to steer a subtly different course between rationally active priors and 
(mere) prejudices.  
 
 
2. Perception as Inference: Two Ways To Get Things Wrong 
 
A good starting point is the increasingly accepted picture of perception as 
involving a process of sub-personal inference – a process in which prior 
knowledge meets sensory evidence, to generate a percept (Helmholtz 1860, 
MacKay 1956, Neisser 1967, Gregory 1980, Yuille and Kersten 2006, 
Friston et al 2012). This is a process that can deliver false results even when 
the processing itself is (arguably) ‘optimal’ in the way it combines priors and 
sensory evidence. I begin by looking at just such a case, before turning to 
some more puzzling ones that involve radically disturbed forms of 
processing and are more akin, I’ll argue, to the epistemically unacceptable 
kinds of double-counting that RP rightly fears.  
 
In a famous treatment, Weiss et al. (2002) show that a wide variety of 
motion illusions flow directly from the use of ideally rational (‘Bayes-
optimal’) means of integrating priors and incoming sensory information. 
The illusions follow given only the ecologically reasonable priors that there 
is noise in the initial measurements, and that slower motions are more likely 
than faster ones. An intuitive example is driving in the fog. Here, drivers 
show a regrettable tendency to speed up and to underestimate their own and 
others velocities. This is because fog signifies low contrast (poor quality) 
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visual information about speed. Priors are biased toward slow speeds, as 
these are ecologically the norm. In the noisy sensory situation, these priors 
dominate and we may underestimate the true speeds of the cars. Weiss et al. 
(2002) conclude that: 
   
 “Many motion “illusions” are not the result of sloppy computation 
by various components in the visual system, but rather a result of a 
coherent computational strategy that is optimal under reasonable 
assumptions”. 2002, 603 
  
These illusions result inevitably from the operation of a paradigmatically  
rational sub-personal regime that combines priors and (raw) sensory 
evidence in ways that work well in most cases. It is the intuitive reasonableness 
of this underlying (sub-personal) processing, not its doubtless debatable 
‘optimality’, that matters for my argument. Even at the best of times, this is 
clearly a delicate balancing act.  It is often reasonable to let prior knowledge 
cause you to ignore some incoming ‘evidence’ or apparent ‘measurement’ 
(treating it as noise) and instead to fill-in using expected values. If you don’t 
do this, if you under-weight your priors, you will fail to spot faint patterns 
(like that famous Dalmatian against the spotty backdrop) hidden in noisy or 
ambiguous settings. But if you over-weight the priors, you will start to  
hallucinate patterns that are not there, just because you strongly expect 
them.  
 
Just such an effect is shown in, for example, the so-called  White Christmas  
experiments (Merckelbach and van de Ven 2001). Here, subjects were told 
that an audio clip would contain, hidden somewhere in the short segment, 
the rather faint onset of Bing Crosby’s ‘White Christmas’. The 
experimenters found that almost one-third of the subjects reported 
detecting the onset of the song. But the sound file contained only white 
noise – there was no trace of White Christmas hidden anywhere in the 
noise. The ability of some folk to ‘detect’ the familiar song is just an 
expression of an ability central to perceptual search and perceptual 
awareness in general: the ability to discount some aspects of a signal, 
treating them as ‘noise’, while accentuating other aspects, thus treating them 
as ‘signal’. This ability, deployed under the influence of the strong 
expectation of a weak ‘hard-to-detect’ fragment of the familiar song, allows 
many perfectly normal subjects to enjoy what is in effect an auditory 
hallucination.  
 
Neurally plausible process models such as ‘predictive processing’ (Bastos et 
al. 2012) depict these delicate balances between prior knowledge and 
sensory evidence as varying according to systemic estimates of the relative 
value or reliability (‘precision’) of each source – the priors, and the various 
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bits of prima facie sensory evidence) in context. This involves the use of 
neuromodulators such as dopamine to vary the post-synaptic weighting, or 
gain, on the incoming sensory information versus the prior-based ‘top-
down’ prediction.  
 
This is a long story, with many moving parts. But one key, relevant, idea 
(Griffin and Fletcher 2017) is that many forms of psychosis and aberrant 
experience may indeed involve a vicious cycle – very much akin to that 
which RP depicts as ‘hijacked experience’ – in which priors and sensory 
experience become locked in a self-entrenching spiral whereby subtly altered 
high-level beliefs help construct subtly altered percepts that appear to 
confirm and reinforce those very beliefs. 
 
This kind of spiral plausibly occurs in some cases of schizophrenia, where 
early false inferences lead to subtly altered percepts that in turn seem to 
evidence and entrench increasingly bizarre beliefs. In this way, the two 
‘positive symptoms’ of schizophrenia (delusions and hallucinations) emerge 
as co-emerging and co-determining aspects of a single fault in a multi-level 
(Bayesian) inference regime. The improbable (replacement, telepathy, 
conspiracy) slowly but surely becomes the least surprising, as false 
perceptions and bizarre beliefs become locked into an epistemically 
insulated, self-confirming cycle (Fletcher and Frith 2009).  
 
Griffin and Fletcher (2017) describes how the same kind of process could 
explain some cases of Capgras delusion – the belief that your loved one has 
been replaced by an imposter. This is a  condition that may be seeded  by a 
lack (however caused) of some sub-personally  predicted physiological 
response in their presence. But this seed may lead, the authors argue, to a 
spiral of false inference that sounds uncannily reminiscent of Siegel’s Jack 
and Jill thought experiment. It is worth quoting their description in some 
detail: 
 
“The first experience may consist of nothing more strange or specific 
than a mild sense of jamais vu that leads one to fleetingly imagine the 
impostor idea without taking it seriously. However, on the second 
occasion ….merely having entertained the impostor idea at a high 
level [increases its plausibility….. Perhaps, this time, the [loved one] 
seems not merely unfamiliar but also suspicious (e.g., their smile is 
now perceived perhaps as having a mocking or sinister quality)…In 
Bayesian terms, the impostor hypothesis is more probable given this second 
experience than it was given the first experience.” 2017 p.279 
  
Griffin and Fletcher cite multiple known effects that could play a role in this 
kind of process. 70% of Capgras cases occur in individuals diagnosed with 
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schizophrenia.  Even for neurotypical agents, the “mere act of imagining a 
hypothesis raises its subjective probability next time it is entertained” (Arkes 
et al. 1991, Garry et al. 1996, Goff&Roediger 1998) even “when what is 
imagined is bizarre and a priori implausible” (Seamon et al. 2006, Thomas & 
Loftus 2002). The ‘imagination inflation effect’ is “stronger the more vividly 
the hypothesis was imagined” (Sherman et al. 1985, Thomas et al 2003), and 
schizophrenic subjects display a strong tendency towards vivid mental 
imagery (Oertel et al. 2009).  Finally, the effect is greater for emotional 
interpersonal events than for neutral ones (Szpunar & Schacter 2013), which 
speaks to the emotionally charged nature of many delusions.  
 
In other words, multiple effects that occur even in neurotypical processing 
are (in the case of psychosis) being co-opted as part of a rolling process in 
which inference goes steadily astray. We do not confront the sudden 
emergence of a full-blown psychosis. Instead, when neuromodulatory 
systems are radically disturbed, what is compromised is the temporally 
extended process of perceptual inference itself. Now, looping effects of the 
kind feared by Siegel do indeed emerge. Describing these, Jardi and Deneve 
(2013) suggest that: 
  
 “bottom-up sensory information and top-down predictions are 
reverberated: prior beliefs are misinterpreted as sensory observations 
and vice versa. As a result, these predictions are counted multiple 
times” 2013, 3227 
  
 Jardri and Deneve call this ‘circular belief propagation’ (see also Jardi et al 
2017). 
 
All this sets the scene for the question I wish to pursue. In RP style cases of 
‘perceptual hi-jacking’ do we see at work something more like the Weiss 
scenario, where the combination of priors and sensory evidence leads to 
generally correct outcomes in the ecologically normal environment? Or is it 
more like the psychosis model, in which disturbed neuromodulatory 
economies yield disturbed patterns of inference over time, allowing priors 
and percepts to become progressively more and more tightly locked into a 
reverberating, mutually misleading dance? 
 
3. Bedrock City – Some Thought Experiments 
 
I think we can make progress on this by imagining a couple of scenarios 
involving ordinary perception. 
 
Scenario 1: Seeing Dino 
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You look out the window of your house in Bedrock City and see a familiar-
looking shape. Your high-level belief that the object most likely to be in the 
yard is your pet dinosaur, Dino, then programs a very specific set of visual 
saccades that aim to harvest evidence for that very hypothesis. Your 
exploratory saccades aim to discover a specific shape, and pay special 
attention to that distinctive  perky tail. If the object is indeed Dino, you 
should get that very evidence, allowing the system to settle into a stable 
percept. It seems entirely right that at that point your systemic faith in the 
Dino hypothesis increases. This is exactly the (paradigmatically rational) 
process described in Friston et al 2012. 
 
Scenario 2: Not Seeing Dino 
 
Next, let’s assume that it is a foggy night, or you are a little distracted, or 
didn’t get quite enough sleep. As before, your strong prior belief that it is 
Dino in the yard programs a sequence of exploratory saccades. You briefly 
explore the scene, the test is passed, you seem to see the outline of Dino, 
perky tail and all. Systemic faith that it is Dino increases. But this time you 
are wrong. In fact, it is Baby Puss, your sabre-toothed cat again, trying to 
sneak back into the house. 
 
How should RP treat the situation here? Should we, under such 
circumstances, not allow the resulting (false) Dino percept, that likewise  
passes the test of programming saccades that seem to confirm the 
hypothesis, to properly  increase your degree of belief that it is Dino in the 
yard? Should we impose an epistemic downgrade on that percept, blocking 
it from rationally increasing your confidence in the belief that Dino is in the 
yard? It is true that, just as in the case of angry Jack, the percept was partly 
caused by the belief that it then cements. But this was also true in the 
previous, and (I suggest) paradigmatically rational scenario.  
  
I suggest that downgrade can be justified in neither of the two cases. 
Epistemically, the cases are on a par -  each depicts a reasonable response to 
the evidence, given the priors, and each confronts (and passes) the tribunal 
of ongoing testing by programming actions.  
 
To press this, consider the case where, in Scenario 2, the animal (wrongly 
identified as Dino) suddenly starts to roar or meow, and I rapidly re-parse 
the foggy scene, seeing the sabre-toothed cat. The route to this rationally 
revised percept still strongly implicates my priors - that pesky cat was, after 
all, the next-most-probable cause. But I am surely right to take the success 
of the cat hypothesis at accommodating these new waves of sensory 
evidence as itself increasing the subjective probability that the object is my 
cat. To think otherwise would be to deprive me of a standard, and crucial, 
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route to rational belief revision. The upshot is that we cannot downgrade 
the second case without downgrading the (paradigmatically rational) 
revision-variant too.  
 
The bigger picture here involves appreciating that percepts are simply not 
ends-in-themselves. They are tools that lead us to sample the world in ways 
that aim to minimize long-term uncertainty. As such,  they are tested in on-
going actions (including visual saccades) and as long as they pass the tests 
the guiding hypothesis gains in plausibility. Their epistemic value is thus 
defined not by their snapshot content but by their role in guiding temporally 
extended cycles of perception and action. What matters here, as in science 
itself, is the longer-term openness of the system (via action) to harvesting 
and recognizing disconfirming evidence. Just because what we expect to see 
influences what we do see, that doesn’t block that possibility. And as long as 
it doesn’t, the influence of prior belief on prior-belief confirming percept 
seems benign. 
 
In closing, note that even if you buy all this, you can still ask about the 
etiology of the priors themselves. This might provide at lest some of the 
leverage that RP rightly seeks regarding cases such as those discussed in 
Chapter 10 concerning  the mistaken perception of a cellphone as a gun 
when held by a black man in a seedy alleyway. What may be at issue between 
us here is the allocation of blame. RP, in such cases, seems to be aiming 
epistemic reproach not at on-board information processing regimes nor 
solely at the cultural milieu but also but at the individuals themselves. For it 
is the individuals who are held to be reasonable or unreasonable. However, I 
can’t see any way to judge the individuals apart from as culturally situated 
cognitive engines exhibiting (or failing to exhibit) certain checks and 
balances in the use of sensory evidence and priors. 
  
Siegel argues (in chapter 10, using the useful image of the ‘mind of the 
world’) that perceptual epistemic downgrade can be simply inherited from a 
bad sample or a statistically unrepresentative environment. I’m strongly 
inclined to accept this. To me, this locates primary blame right where it 
belongs, in the distortive cultural milieu, but lets a form of epistemic damage 
(though not epistemic culpability) be inherited in the form of those badly-
grounded priors. Perhaps we can even go further (as Larissa MacFarquhar 
has suggested to me in conversation) and treat some disturbances to the 
‘mind of the world’ as analogous to flawed reverberating inference in 
schizophrenia. Consider, for example, the ‘fake news meme’. This 
systematically upsets the delicate balances between priors and evidence, 
making room for catastrophic reverberating societal influences that rather 
closely resemble those found in individual psychosis. For a powerful and 
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epistemologically important analysis of such effects, see Vosoughi et al 
2018. 
  
4. Conclusions: Of Bayes and Bathwater 
 
Siegel might (or might not) agree. By the time we get to RP 138-9, the story 
is that inference-based, prior-reflecting influence on percept-formation is 
legitimate iff the pre-conscious perceptual input is ‘given proper weight’ in 
the processing. But exactly what does this imply?  
 
RP claims that Jill’s ‘hijacked experience’ loses power as support of the 
belief that Jack is angry, because of the role of her jack-is-angry prior in 
making the percept one of a subtly angry looking Jack. (see p.21). But this, I 
have argued, is really just Bayesian business as usual, allowing prior beliefs to 
tip an otherwise delicate balance. It doesn’t seem to me that the ongoing 
processing in the individual is in any way at fault here. Some evidence for 
this less damaging diagnosis is provided by thinking about temporally 
extended processing cycles that might (or would not) respond to new 
evidence in apt ways. If instead we follow RP, and epistemically downgrade 
the Angry Jack case, then surely we ought to downgrade the Sabre-tooth cat 
case (section 3) too. But to do so leads, I claim, to a real threat of runaway 
epistemic downgrading – of throwing out rational, hypothesis-testing Bayes 
with the unwanted bathwater.  
 
Fortunately, there is a clear and promising alternative. The alternative is to 
fault the individual inference engine only when it is systematically 
reverberating very faint evidence or very strong priors, becoming 
progressively more and more closed to new information. We would then 
worry about the appearance of double-counting only in cases that have 
more in common with runaway psychosis than with the (always ampliative 
and hence always fallible) use of prior knowledge to speed processing, 
reduce ambiguity, and separate newsworthy signal from noise. 
 
  
  
 * This paper was written with support from ERC Advanced Grant 
XSPECT - DLV-692739 (‘Expecting Ourselves: Prediction, Action, and the 
Embodied Mind’). 
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